Though Deep Neural Networks (DNN) show excellent performance across various computer vision tasks, several works show their vulnerability to adversarial samples, i.e., image samples with imperceptible noise engineered to manipulate the network's prediction. Adversarial sample generation methods range from simple to complex optimization techniques. Majority of these methods generate adversaries through optimization objectives that are tied to the pre-softmax or softmax output of the network. In this work we, (i) show the drawbacks of such attacks, (ii) propose two new evaluation metrics: Old Label New Rank (OLNR) and New Label Old Rank (NLOR) in order to quantify the extent of damage made by an attack, and (iii) propose a new adversarial attack FDA: Feature Disruptive Attack, to address the drawbacks of existing attacks. FDA works by generating image perturbation that disrupt features at each layer of the network and causes deep-features to be highly corrupt. This allows FDA adversaries to severely reduce the performance of deep networks. We experimentally validate that FDA generates stronger adversaries than other state-of-theart methods for image classification, even in the presence of various defense measures. More importantly, we show that FDA disrupts feature-representation based tasks even without access to the task-specific network or methodology.
Introduction
With the advent of deep-learning based algorithms, remarkable progress has been achieved in various computer vision applications. However, a plethora of existing works [9, 49, 8, 39] , have clearly established that Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are susceptible to adversarial samples: input data containing imperceptible noise specifically crafted to manipulate the network's prediction. Further, Szegedy et al. [49] showed that adversarial samples transfer across models i.e., adversarial samples generated for one * Work done as a member of Video Analytics Lab, IISc, India. Figure 1 . Using feature inversion [34] , we visualize the M ixed 7b representation of Inception-V3 [48] . The inversion of PGDattacked sample (d) is remarkably similar to inversion of clean sample (c). In contrast, inversion of FDA-attacked sample (b) completely obfuscates the clean sample's information. model can adversely affect other unrelated models as well. This transferable nature of adversarial samples further increases the vulnerability of DNNs deployed in real world. As DNNs become more-and-more ubiquitous, especially in decision-critical applications, such as Autonomous Driving [2] , the necessity of investigating adversarial samples has become paramount.
Majority of existing attacks [49, 13, 33, 16] , generate adversarial samples via optimizing objectives that are tied to the pre-softmax or softmax output of the network. The sole objective of these attacks is to generate adversarial samples which are misclassified by the network with very high con-fidence. While the classification output is changed, it is unclear what happens to the internal deep representations of the network. Hence, we ask a fundamental question: Do deep features of adversarial samples retain usable clean sample information?
In this work, we demonstrate that deep features of adversarial samples generated using such attacks retain high-level semantic information of the corresponding clean samples. This is due to the fact that these attacks optimize only presoftmax or softmax score based objective to generate adversarial samples. We provide evidence for this observation by leveraging feature inversion [35] , where, given a feature representation ψ(x), we optimize to construct the approximate inverse ψ −1 (ψ(x)). Using the ability to visualize deep features, we highlight the retention of clean information in deep features of adversarial samples. The fact that deep features of adversarial samples retain clean sample information has important implications:
• First, such deep features may still be useful for various feature driven tasks such as caption generation [52, 58] , and style-transfer [21, 25, 51] .
• Secondly, these adversarial samples cause the model to either predict semantically similar class or to retain high (comparatively) probability for the original label, while predicting a very different class. These observations are captured by using the proposed metrics i.e., New Label's Old Rank (NLOR) and Old Label's New Rank (OLNR), and statistics such as fooling rate at k th rank.
These implications are major drawbacks of existing attacks which optimize only pre-softmax or softmax score based objectives. Based on these observations, in this work, we seek adversarial samples that can corrupt deep features and inflict severe damage to feature representations. With this motivation, we introduce FDA: Feature Disruptive attack. FDA generates perturbation with the aim to cause disruption of features at each layer of the network in a principled manner. This results in corruption of deep features, which in turn degrades the performance of the network. Figure 1 shows feature inversion from deep features of a clean, a PGD [33] attacked, and a FDA attacked sample, highlighting the lack of clean sample information after our proposed attack.
Following are the benefits of our proposed attack: (i) FDA invariably flips the predicted label to highly unrelated classes, while also successfully removing evidence of the clean sample's predicted label. As we elaborate in section 5, other attacks [49, 30, 13] only achieve one of the above objectives. (ii) Unlike existing attacks, FDA disrupts feature-representation based tasks e.g., caption generation, even without access to the task-specific network or methodology i.e., it is effective in a gray-box attack setting. (iii) FDA generates stronger adversaries than other state-of-theart methods for Image classification. Even in the presence of various recently proposed defense measures (including adversarial training), our proposed attack consistently outperforms other existing attacks.
In summary, the major contributions of this work are:
• We demonstrate the drawbacks of existing attacks.
• We propose two new evaluation metrics i.e., NLOR and OLNR, in order to quantify the extent of damage made by an attack method.
• We introduce a new attack called FDA motivated by corrupting features at every layer. We experimentally validate that FDA creates stronger white-box adversaries than other attacks on ImageNet dataset for stateof-the-art classifiers, even in the presence of various defense mechanisms.
• Finally, we successfully attack two feature basedtasks, namely caption generation and style transfer where current attack methods either fail or are exhibit weaker attack than FDA. A novel "Gray-Box" attack scenario is also presented where FDA again exhibits stronger attacking capability.
Related Works
Attacks: Following the demonstration by Szegedy et al. [49] on the existence of adversarial samples, multiple works [22, 38, 29, 16, 4, 33, 13, 10] Defenses: Goodfellow et al. [22] first showed that including adversarial samples in the training regime increases robustness of DNNs to adversarial attacks. Following this work, multiple approaches [30, 50, 27, 54, 17, 33] have been proposed for adversarial training, addressing important concerns such as Gradient masking, and label leaking.
Recent works [40, 31, 1, 46, 15, 11] , present many alternative to adversarial training. Crucially, works such as [23, 56, 53] propose defense techniques which can be easily implemented for large scale datasets such as ImageNet. While Guo et al. [23] propose utilizing input transformation as a defense technique, Xie et al. [56] introduce randomized transformations in the input as a defense.
Feature Visualization: Feature inversion has a long history in machine learning [55] . Mahendran et al. [34] proposed an optimization method for feature inversion, combining feature reconstruction with regularization objectives. Contrarily, Dosovitskiy et al. [18] introduce a neural network for imposing image priors on the reconstruction. Recent works such as [45, 20] have followed the suit. The reader is referred to [19] for a comprehensive survey.
Feature-based Tasks: DNNs have become the preferred feature extractors over hand-engineered local descriptors like SIFT or HOG [5, 7] . Hence, various tasks such as captioning [52, 58] , and image-retrieval [12, 24] rely on DNNs for extracting image information. Recently, tasks such as style-transfer have been introduced which rely on deep features as well. While works such as [25, 51] propose a learning based approach, Gatys et al. [21] perform an optimization on selected deep features.
We show that previous attacks create adversarial samples which still provide useful information for featurebased tasks. In contrast, FDA inflicts severe damage to feature-based tasks without any task-specific information or methodology.
Preliminaries
We define a classifier f :
x is the m dimensional input, and y is the c dimensional score vector containing pre-softmax scores for the c different classes. Applying softmax on the output y gives us the predicted probabilities for the c classes, and argmax(y) is taken as the predicted label for input x. Let y GT represent the ground truth label of sample x. Now, an adversarial samplex can be defined as any input sample such that:
where d(x,x) < acts as an imperceptibility constraint, and is typically considered as a l 2 or l ∞ constraint. Attacks such as [49, 22, 16, 33] , find adversarial samples by different optimization methods, but with the same optimization objective: maximizing the cross-entropy loss J(f (x), y GT ) for the adversarial samplex. Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [49] performs a single step optimiza-tion, yielding an adversary :
On the other hand, PGD [33] and I-FGSM [22] performs a multi-step signed-gradient ascent on this objective. Works such as [16, 4] , further integrate Momentum and ADAM optimizer for maximizing the objective.
Kurakin et al. [30] discovered the phenomena of label leaking and use predicted label instead of y GT . This yields a class of attacks which can be called most-likely attacks, where the loss objective is changed to J(f (x), y M L ) (where y M L represents the class with the maximum predicted probability).
Works such as [27, 50] note that above methods yield adversarial samples which are weak, in the sense of being misclassified into a very similar class (for e.g., a hound misclassified as a terrier). They posit that targeted attacks are more meaningful, and utilize least likely attacks, proposing minimization of Loss objective J(f (x), y LL ) (where y LL represents the class with the least predicted probability). We denote the most-likely and the least-likely variant of any attack by the suffix ML and LL.
Carlini et al. [13] propose multiple different objectives and optimization methods for generating adversaries. Among the proposed objectives, they infer that the strongest objective is as follows:
where (e) + is short-hand for max(e, 0). For a l ∞ distance metric adversary, this objective can be integrated with PGD optimization to yield PGD-CW. The notation introduced in this section is followed throughout the paper. Feature inversion: Feature inversion can be summarized as the problem of finding the sample whose representation is the closest match to a given representation [55] . We use the approach proposed by Mahendran et al. [34] . Additionally, to improve the inversion, we use Laplacian pyramid gradient normalization. We provide additional information in the supplementary.
Feature Disruptive Attack

Drawbacks of existing attacks
In this section, we provide qualitative evidence to show that deep features corresponding to adversarial samples generated by existing attacks (i.e., attacks that optimize objectives tied to the softmax or pre-softmax layer of the network), retain high level semantic information of its corresponding clean sample. We use feature inversion to provide evidence for this observation. Figure 2 shows the feature inversion for different layers of VGG-16 [44] architecture trained on ImageNet dataset, for the clean and its corresponding adversarial sample. From Fig. 2 , it can be observed that the inversion of adversarial features of PGD-LL sample [33] is remarkably similar to the inversion of features of clean sample. Further, in section 5.1, we statistically show the similarity between intermediate feature representations of clean and its corresponding adversarial samples generated using different existing attack methods. Finally, in section 5.2 we show that as a consequence of retaining clean sample information, these adversarial samples cause the model to either predict semantically similar class or to retain high (comparatively) probability for the original label, while predicting a very different class. These observations are captured by using the proposed metrics i.e., New Label Old Rank (NLOR) and Old Label New Rank (OLNR), and statistics such as fooling rate at k-th rank.
Proposed evaluation metrics
An attack's strength is typically measured in terms of fooling rate [37] , which measures the percentage (%) of images for which the predicted label was changed due to the attack. However, only looking at fooling rate does not present the full picture of the attack. On one hand, attacks such as PGD-ML may result in flipping of label into a semantically similar class, and on the other hand, attacks such as PGD-LL may flip the label to a very different class, while still retaining high (comparatively) probability for the orig-inal label. These drawbacks are not captured in the existing evaluation metric i.e., Fooling rate.
Hence, we propose two new evaluation metrics, New Label Old Rank (NLOR) and Old Label New Rank (OLNR). For a given input image, the softmax output of a Cway classifier represents the confidence for each of the C classes. We sort these class confidences in descending order (from rank 1 to C). Consider the prediction of the network before the attack as the old label and after the attack as the new label. Post attack, the rank of the old label will change from 1 to say 'p'. This new rank 'p' of the old label is defined as OLNR (Old Label's New Rank). Further, post attack, the rank of the new label would have changed from say 'q' to 1. This old rank 'q' of the new label is defined as NLOR (New Label's Old Rank). Hence, a stronger attack should flip to a label which had a high old rank (which will yield high NLOR), and also reduce probability for the clean prediction (which will yield a high OLNR). These metrics are computed for all the mis-classified images and the mean value is reported.
Proposed attack
We now present Feature Disruptive Attack (FDA), our proposed attack formulation explicitly designed to generate perturbation that contaminate and corrupt the internal representations of a DNN. The aim of the proposed attack is to generate image specific perturbation which, when added to the image should not only flip the label but also disrupt its inner feature representations at each layer of the DNN. We first note that activations supporting the current prediction have to be lowered, whereas activations which do not support the current prediction have to be strengthened and increased. This can lead to feature representations which, while hiding the true information, contains high activations for features not present in the image. Hence, for a given i th layer l i , our layer objective L, which we want to increase is given by:
where l i (x) Nj represents the N j th value of l i (x), S i represents the set of activations which support the current prediction, and D is a monotonically increasing function of activations l(x) Nj (on the partially ordered set R |Si| ). We define D as the l 2 -norm of inputs l i (x).
Finding the set S i is non-trivial. While all high activations may not support the current prediction, in practice, we find it to be usable approximation. We define the support set S i as:
where C is a measure of central tendency. We try various choices of C including median(l i (x)) and inter-quartilemean(l i (x)). Overall, we find spatial-mean(l i (x)) = C(h, w) (mean across channels) to be the most effective formulation. Finally, combining Eq. (4) and (5), our layer objective L becomes:
We perform this optimization at each non-linearity in the network, and combine the per-layer objectives as follows:
Figure 3 provides a visual overview of the proposed method. In supplementary document we provide results for ablation study of the proposed attack i.e., different formulation of C such as median, Inter-Quartile-mean etc.
Experiments
In this section, we first present statistical analysis of the features corresponding to adversarial samples generated using existing attacks and the proposed attack. Further, we show the effectiveness of the proposed attack on (i) image recognition in white-box (Sec. 5.2) and black-box settings (shown in supplementary document), (ii) Featurerepresentation based tasks (Sec. 5.4) i.e., caption generation and style-transfer. We define optimization budget of an attack by the tuple ( , nb iter , iter ), where is the L ∞ norm limit on the perturbation added to the image, nb iter defines the number of optimization iterations used by the attack method, and iter is the increment in the L ∞ norm limit of the perturbation at each iteration. 
Statistical analysis of adversarial features
In this section, we present the analysis which fundamentally motivates our attack formulation. We present various experiments, which posit that attack formulations tied to pre-softmax based objectives retain clean sample information in deep features, whereas FDA is effective at removing them. For all the following experiments, all attacks have been given the same optimization budget ( = 8, nb iter = 10, iter = 1). Reported numbers have been averaged over 1000 image samples.
First, we measure the similarity between intermediate feature representations of the clean and its corresponding adversarial samples generated using different attack methods. Figure 4 , shows average cosine distance between intermediate feature representations of the clean and its corresponding adversarial samples, for various attack methods on PNasNet [32] architecture. From Fig. 4 it can be observed that for the proposed attack, feature dis-similarity is much higher than to that of the other attacks. The significant difference in cosine distance implies that contamination of intermediate feature is much higher for the proposed attack. We observe similar trend in other models at different optimization budgets ( , nb iter , iter ) as well (refer supplementary). Now, we measure the similarity between features of clean and adversarial samples at the pre-logits layer (i.e., input to the classification layer) of the network. Apart from cosine distance, we also measure the Normalized Rank Transformation (NRT) distance. NRT-distance represents the average shift in the rank of the k th ordered statistic ∀ k. Primary benefit of NRT-distance measure is its robustness to outliers. Table 1 , tabulates the result for pre-logit output for multiple architectures. It can be observed that our proposed attack shows superiority to other methods. Although the pre-logits representations from other attacks seem to be cor- Table 1 . Metrics for measuring the dissimilarity between adversarial pre-logits and clean pre-logits on different networks. Our method FDA exhibits stronger dissimilarity. rupted, in section 5 we show that these pre-logits representation provide useful information for feature-based tasks.
PGD-ML PGD-CW PGD-
Attack on Image Recognition
ImageNet [42] is one of the most frequently used largescale dataset for evaluating adversarial attacks. We evaluate our proposed attack on five DNN architectures trained on ImageNet dataset, including state-of-the-art PNASNet [32] architecture. We compare FDA to the strongest white-box optimization method (PGD), with different optimization objective, resulting in the following set of competing attacks: PGD-ML, PGD-LL, and PGD-CW.
We present our evaluation on the ImageNet-compatible dataset introduced in NIPS 2017 challenge (contains 5, 000 images). To provide a comprehensive analysis of our proposed attack, we present results with different optimization budgets. Note that attacks are compared only when they have the same optimization budget. Table 2 : top section presents the evaluation of multiple attack formulations across different DNN architectures with the optimization budget ( = 4, nb iter = 5, iter = 1) in white-box setting. A crucial inference is the partial success of other attacks in terms of NLOR and OLNR. They either achieve significant NLOR or OLNR. This is due to the singular objective of either lowering the maximal probability, or increasing probability of the least-likely class. Table 2 also highlights the significant drop in performance of other attack for deeper networks (PNASNet [32] and Inception-ResNet [47] ) due to vanishing gradients.
In Figure 5 , we present Generalizable Fooling Rate [41] with respect to Top-k accuracy as a function of k. The significantly higher Generalizable Fooling Rate at high k values further establishes the superiority of our proposed attack on networks trained on ImageNet dataset.
Evaluation against Defense proposals
Now, we present evaluation against defenses mechanisms which have been scaled to ImageNet (experiments on defense mechanisms in smaller dataset (CIFAR-10) [28] are provided in the supplementary document). Adversarial Training: We test our proposed attack against three adversarial training regimes, namely: Simple (adv) [30] , Ensemble (ens3) [50] and Adversarial-logit-pairing (alp) [27] based adversarial training. We set the optimization budget of ( = 8, nb iter = 5, iter = 2) for all the attacks on adv and ens3 models. Table 2 : bottom section presents the results of our evaluation. Further, to show effectiveness at different optimization budgets, alp models are tested with different optimization budget, as show in Table 3 .
Defense Mechanisms:
We also test our model against defense mechanisms proposed by Guo et al. [23] and Xie et al. [56] . Table 4 shows fooling rate achieved in Inception-ResNet V2 [47] , under the presence of various defense mechanisms. The above results confirm the superiority of our proposed attack for white-box attack.
Attacking Feature-Representation based tasks
Caption Generation
Most DNNs involved in real-world applications utilize transfer learning to alleviate problems such as data scarcity and efficiency. Furthermore, due to the easy accessibility of trained models on ImageNet dataset, such models have become the preferred starting point for training task-specific models. This presents an interesting scenario, where the attacker may have the knowledge of which model was finetuned for the given task, but may not have access to the fine-tuned model.
Due to the partial availability of information, such a scenario in essence acts as a "Gray-Box" setup. We hypothesize that in such a scenario, feature-corruption based attacks should be more effective than softmax or pre-softmax based attacks. To test this hypothesis, we attack the captiongenerator "Show-and-Tell" (SAT) [52] , which utilizes a Im-ageNet trained Inception-V3 (IncV3) model as the starting point, using adversaries generated from only the ImageNettrained IncV3 network. Note that the IncV3 in SAT has been fine-tuned for 2 Million steps (albeit with a smaller learning rate). Table 5 presents the effect of adversarial attacks on caption generation. We attack "Show-and-Tell" [52] . Similar performance can be expected on advanced models such as [26, 58] . We clearly see the effectiveness of FDA in such a "Gray-Box" scenario, validating the presented hypothesis. Additionally, we note the content-specific metrics such as SPICE [3] , are far more degraded. This is due to the fact that other attacks may change the features only to support a similar yet different object class, whereas FDA aims to completely removes the evidence of the clean sample.
We further show results for attacking SAT in a "Whitebox" setup in Table 6 . We compare against Hongge et al. [14] as well, an attack specifically formulated for caption generation. While the prime benefit of Hongge et al. is the ability to perform targeted attack, we observe that we are comparable to Hongge et al. in the untargeted scenario. Table 2 . Evaluation of various attacks on networks trained on ImageNet dataset, in white-box setting. Top: Comparison on normally trained architectures, with the optimization budget (refer section 5) of ( = 4, nbiter = 5, iter = 1). Bottom: Comparison on adversarially trained models (adv & ens), with the budget ( = 8, nbiter = 5, iter = 2). The salient feature of our attack is high performance on all metrics at the same time.
Metrics
Fooling Rate NLOR OLNR 
Style-transfer
From its introduction in [21] , Style-transfer has been a highly popular application of DNNs, specially in arts. However, to the best of our knowledge, adversarial attacks on Style-transfer have not yet been studied. Earlier method by Gatys et al. [21] proposed an op- timization based approach, which utilizes gradients from trained networks to create an image which retains "content" from one image, and "style" from another. We first show that adversaries generated from other methods (PGD etc.) completely retain the structural content of the clean sample, allowing them to be used for style transfer without any loss in quality. In contrast, as FDA adversaries corrupts the clean information. Hence, apart from causing misclassification, FDA adversaries also severely damage styletransfer. Figure 6 : top shows example of style-transfer on clean, PGD-adversarial, and FDA adversarial sample. More importantly, FDA disrupts style-transfer without utilizing any task-specific knowledge or methodology. Table 5 . Attacking "Show-and-Tell"(SAT) [52] in a "Gray-box" setup with budget ( = 8, nbiter = 10, iter = 1). The rightmost column tabulates the metrics when complete white noise is given as input. FDA Adversaries generated from Inception-V3 are highly effective for disrupting SAT. Table 6 . Attacking (SAT) [52] in a "White-box" setup with budget ( = 8, nbiter = 10, iter = 1). FDA is at-par with task-specific attack [14] Metrics No Attack PGD-ML MI-FGSM [14] In [25] , Johnson et al. introduced a novel approach where a network is trained to perform style-transfer in a single forward pass. In such a setup it is infeasible to mount an attack with PGD-like adversaries as there is no final layer to derive loss-gradients from. In contrast, with the whitebox access to the parameters of these networks, FDA adversaries can be generated to disrupt style-transfer, without any change in its formulation. Figure 6 : bottom shows qualitative examples of disruption caused due to FDA adversaries in the model proposed by Johnson et al. Style-transfer has been applied to videos as well. We have provided qualitative results in the supplementary to show that FDA remains highly effective in disrupting stylized videos as well.
Conclusion
In this work, we establish the retention of clean sample information in adversarial samples generated by attacks that optimizes objective tied to softmax or pre-softmax layer of the network. This is found to be true even when these samples are misclassified with high confidence. Further, we highlight the weakness of such attacks using the proposed evaluation metrics: OLNR and NLOR. We then propose FDA, an adversarial attack which corrupts the features at each layer of the network. We experimentally validate that FDA generates one of the strongest white-box adversaries. Additionally, we show that feature of FDA adversarial samples do not allow extraction of useful information for feature-based tasks such as style-transfer, and captiongeneration as well.
